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Brogan  1 
ROSETTA STONE LTD. V. GOOGLE INCORPORATED 
TRADEMARKING LANGUAGE: GOOGLE'S ADWORDS AND THE VALUE 
OF ONLINE SEARCHING 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The phrase, “just Google it” is one that has become frequently used and 
understood by many internet users today to be synonymous with an idea of informal 
research with instantaneous results. It has become the “norm” to type a familiar phrase or 
product into Google’s search engine and within moments you are met with results that 
often provide you with exactly what you were searching for. To date, it has been 
estimated that over 2.2 billion people use the Internet; this means over one-third of the 
human race has logged on at least once during their lives. 
1
 In analyzing a trademark 
(TM) infringement case, it is of utmost importance to analyze several issues and factors 
before coming to a decision. Recently the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not come to the same 
decision with the Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. Google Inc because they approached the issues in 
different ways.
2
 The plaintiff, Rosetta Stone Ltd.,  (“Rosetta Stone”) sued Google Inc., 
(“Google”) for trademark infringement, asserting that Google was “actively assisting 
third party advertisers to mislead consumers and misappropriate Rosetta Stone's 
trademarks by using the trademarks (1) as keyword triggers for paid advertisements and 
(2) within the title and text of paid advertisements on Google's website.”3 A further 
examination of the various issues considered by the two courts may shed some light on 
                                                        
1
 Internet Users in the World: Distribution by World Regions 2011, Internet Stats, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited, July 17, 2012).  
2
 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (E.D. Va. 2010) aff'd in 
part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) 
3 Id at 534.  
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the approach courts are beginning to take when confronted with issues of  trademark 
infringement.   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. History of Rosetta Stone Ltd.  
 
In 2010, Rosetta Stone brought action against Google by asserting several claims 
with regard to Google’s alleged unlawful infringement on Rosetta Stone’s registered 
trademark.
4
 Rosetta Stone is a technology-based language learning company that 
provides their customers with products and services in order to help them learn a new 
language.
5
  Founded in 1992 and based out of Virginia, Rosetta Stone is now the leading 
language education company in the United States.
6
 Rosetta Stone has several registered 
trademarks (ROSETTA STONE, ROSETTA STONE LANGUAGE LEARNING 
SUCCESS, ROSETTASTONE.COM, and ROSETTA WORLD) and has been active in 
advertising their product using these marks though various media outlets.
7
 Rosetta Stone 
first began advertising in connection with Google’s website and online services ten years 
ago in 2002.
8
 Rosetta Stone continues to advertise in connection with Google to this day.
9
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 Id.  
5
Id.   
6
Id.  
7
Id. 
8
 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 150(4th Cir. Va. 2012) 
9
 Id.  
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B. Google and the Development of the AdWords Program 
  
Google is one of the world’s most used search engines. Google is a worldwide 
force, with its content network reaching 80% of global internet users and over 70% of 
U.S. Internet searches being done using Google's search engine.
10
 Google states that their 
mission as a company is to “organize the world’s information and make it universally 
accessible and useful.”11 In order to achieve this goal, Google offers a multitude of 
products and services through various technological outlets in order to help their users 
organize and share in the world’s information. 12 One of the more controversial ways that 
Google makes a profit is through its highly successful program Ad Words, which offers 
advertisers coveted advertising space for relevant searches.
13
  
Ad Words is a program that helps companies advertise and promote their products 
or services on Google’s websites. 14 This program works by providing highly relevant ads 
and suggestions to third party users who have entered keywords and various other 
searches into the Google search engine.
15
 As explained by Google, “every time someone 
searches on Google, AdWords runs an auction to determine the ads that show on the  
                                                        
10
Id.  
11 About Google, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
12
 About Google Products Offered, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/products/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
13
  Our Products and Services, Google, http://www.google.com/about/company/products/ 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
14
 Into to AdWords, Google, 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704424&from=6382
&rd=1 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
15
 Id.  
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search results, and their rank on the page.”16 Before placing an ad into an auction, an 
advertiser needs to select which customer action they would like to pay for.
17
 AdWords 
allows advertisers to place their ads in a variety of places, explaining that their “ads can 
appear on different places across the web, depending on how [they] target [their]  ads, to 
whom [they] choose to show them [to], and the types of ads [they] create.”18 Most  
advertisers place their bids and “target their ads” around certain popular keywords and 
products.
19
 Keywords are words or phrases that the advertiser chooses that are aimed to 
trigger their ad to show on searches and other Google sites.
20
 These keywords can trigger 
one’s ads to appear next to search results on Google and well as other search sites.21 
Google provides advertisers with helpful tips on how to choose the best word or phrases 
in selecting keywords.
22
 Google suggests that one could to improve an ad’s performance 
by creating “a list of keywords that are relevant to your product or service, and making 
sure they're specific rather than general (for example, "fresh flower delivery" rather than 
simply "flower"). Advertisers can typically show their ad to the people who are most  
                                                        
16 Intro to AdWords, How costs are calculated in AdWords, 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704424&topic=1713
894&path=1710534&ctx=leftnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
17
  Id. (cost-per-click is when someone clicks on your ad, cost-per-impression is how 
frequently Google shows your ads, and cost-per-acquisition is how many conversion you 
receive).  
18
 Intro to AdWords, Where your ads can appear, 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704373&topic=1713
894&path=1710534&ctx=leftnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
19 Into to AdWords, How AdWords Work, 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2497976&topic=1713
894&path=1710534&ctx=leftnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id.  
22
 Id. 
Brogan  5 
interested in their product or service.“23 Many advertisers recognize that if they place a 
bid (how much they are willing to spend) on a repeatedly searched or popular keyword, 
the AdWords program provides its customers with coveted ad space on search result 
pages for products similar to theirs.
24
 For many advertisers, they use this program to 
promote their products and goods on the results page an individual receives after 
searching for competitor’s products.25 
However, Google did not always allow advertisers to buy terms associated with 
any trademarks;. Finally, in 2004, Google stopped restricting the sale of trademarked 
terms only to the holder of those marks and allowed advertisers willing to bid through 
their AdWords program the opportunity to buy such terms.
26
 This change was not well 
received by many, especially trademark holders, since this new policy now meant that 
Google’s advertising service no longer provided the holders with the exclusive rights to 
their keywords.
27
 Google’s Vice President of global sales and operations at the time, 
Sheryl Sandberg, explained the reason for the policy change was to cater more to the 
needs of Google’s many users and their desire for less limited search results.28 She stated, 
"by letting people restrict certain words, you're not getting the results that people expect 
from Google" now, "users will decide what's useful."
29
  
In 2009, Google once again altered its trademark policy; “the AdWords Program 
now makes two distinct uses of a given keyword (1) as a trigger to the Sponsored Link  
                                                        
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Stefanie Olsen, Google Plans Trademark Gambit, CNET News (Apr. 13, 2004) 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1038_3-5190324.html  (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
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advertisement and (2) as part of the advertisement itself.”30 Furthermore, the new policy 
permits advertisers other than the brand owner and its authorized licensees “to include the 
trademark in the advertisement's text if they (1) resell legitimate products bearing the 
trademark; (2) sell components, replacement parts, or compatible products corresponding 
to the trademark; or (3) provide non-competitive information about the goods or services 
corresponding to the trademark term.”31 Google’s AdWords trademark policy expresses 
Google’s diluted approach to trademarks and addressing alleged infringement. The policy 
today reads that “there are multiple factors that determine when trademarks can be used  
in AdWords ads and as keywords […] these policies apply only to trademarked terms 
where the owner submitted a valid complaint to Google and requested that the terms be 
restricted in Google ad campaigns.”32 Google further states that “[we] will not investigate 
or restrict the use of trademark terms in keywords, even if a trademark complaint is 
received.”33 Google makes it clear that their trademark policies apply to their Google 
AdWords text ads and Google will enforce restrictions only after the proper trademark 
owners have submitted a valid complaint to their Trust and Safety team.
34
  
Due to their policy change in their AdWords program, Google has had to defend 
itself against unhappy trademark holders in a growing number of legal disputes 
originating from both direct and contributory trademark infringement claims since  
                                                        
30 Supra note 2, at 538.  
31 Id. 
32 AdWords Trademark Policy, Google, 
http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118&topic=13
46940&path=1308252-2585946&ctx=leftnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2012 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
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2004.
35
  The most recent of these cases, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc.
36
 was initially 
heard by the Eastern District of Virginia and then by the United States Court of Appeals  
for the 4th
th
 Circuit .
37
 The difference between the two court’s holdings and their impact 
on trademark law is discussed further in following sections.  
 
C. Trademark Law and Infringement 
 
Trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act of 1946.
38
  Trademark law can be 
successfully applied in reference to the Internet or more specifically to Google’s search 
engine. Trademark law protects consumers “by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark…for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item-the 
item with this mark- is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that 
he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” 39 Trademark law helps consumers distinguish 
between, recognize, trust, and locate brands. 
40
 Trademark law also protects the mark 
holder’s interest while simultaneously fostering competition and maintaining the quality 
of the mark.
41
 Preserving trademark rights for a mark promotes the Act’s goals of  
                                                        
35 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (E.D. Va. 2010) aff'd 
in part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (involving an action 
against Google for the sale through their AdWords program of trademarked terms to third 
party advertisers); Rescuecom Corp v. Google Inc., 562 F. d 123, 124 (2
nd
 Cir. 2009) 
(same); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
48309 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) (same); Gov't Emples. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. 
Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same).  
36 Supra note 2.  
37 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. Va. 2012).  
38 See Lanham Act, §32(1) 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) 
39 Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).  
40
 See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competitions § 2:4 (4
th
 
ed. 2011).  
41
 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 190, 105 S. Ct. 658, 659, 83 
L. Ed. 2d 582 (1985).  
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fostering competition. 
42
 In short, if a Trademark is protected, the producer will be more 
likely to preserve the quality of the mark, compete against others to have the more 
desirable mark and consumers will benefit from the better marks.  
To bring a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act §32(1)
43
, the 
courts have provided that the following must be shown:  
“a cause of action for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act 
requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) it possesses a mark; (2) defendant 
used the mark; (3) defendant's use of the mark occurred in commerce; 
(4) defendant used the mark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services; and (5) defendant 
used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers as to the source 
or origin of goods or services.”44 
 
In this case, Rosetta Stone must establish that they are the owner of a valid, legally 
protected trademark. Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, Google, 
“used the mark…in commerce…in connection with the sale… or advertising of goods or 
services…without the plaintiff’s consent.”45 Then, Rosetta must prove to the Court that 
the use is “likely to cause confusion…as to the affiliation, connection, or association of  
                                                        
42
 Id.  
43
Lanham Act, §32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who 
shall, without the consent of the registrant ... use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant ...” Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005). 
 
44 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78098 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 374 (4th 
Cir. 2001)). 
45
 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir. 2005).  
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[Google] with [Rosetta], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the [ Google’s] 
goods, services, or commercial activities by [Rosetta].
46
 
The fifth requirement of consumer confusion is determined by considering nine 
additional factors. To determine if consumer confusion is likely, the court weighs the 
following factors:  
“(1) strength or distinctiveness of the mark; (2) similarity of the two 
marks to consumers; (3) similarity of the goods and services the marks 
identify; (4) similarity between the facilities used by the markholders; 
(5) similarity of advertising used by the markholders; (6) defendant's 
intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) quality of the defendant's product; (9) 
sophistication of the consuming public.”47 
However, it is important to remember that not all of the factors are relevant or weighed 
equally when being considered. 
48
 
Other areas of trademark law that are analyzed in this case are the functionality 
doctrine, contributory trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, vicarious 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act , and trademark dilution under the 
Lanham Act. 
The functionality doctrine has been around since 1998 when it was adopted by 
Congress.
49
 Congress explicitly prohibited trademark registration or protection under the  
                                                        
46 Supra note 43. 
47 Lanham Act, §32(1) 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1); see also Supra note 2, at 540 ; see also 
George & Co., L.L.C. v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 2009).  
48 Id (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 
1992)).  
49
 Supra note 37, at 161; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5). 
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Lanham Act for a functional product feature
50
and effectively made functionality a 
statutory defense to an incontestably registered mark.
51
 Although there is no expressed 
definition of the term “functional”52 within the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly explained through case law that "a product feature is functional if it is 
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article."
53
 Under Inwood's traditional rule, a product feature is functional if it is "the 
reason the device works."
54
A product feature is functional if it "constitute[s] the actual 
benefit that the customer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a 
particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product."
55
  
Contributory trademark infringement is a "judicially created doctrine" that 
"derive[s] from the common law of torts [and] this liability may be imposed upon those 
who facilitate or encourage infringement. 
56
 The Supreme Court explained in Inwood 
Laboratories
57
 that 
“if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe 
a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product  to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the 
manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.”58 
  
                                                        
50
 Id.  
51
 Supra Note 46; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8); see generally 1 MCCARTHY § 7:63.  
52
 Supra note 46; see also15 U.S.C. § 1127 
53
 Supra note 37, at 161; see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 
456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982); see also TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33, 121 S. Ct. 1255, 149 L. 
Ed. 2d 164 (2001). 
54
 Id. (citing Board of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 
2008)).  
55 Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1989).    
56Supra note 46, at 163.; see also 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 25:17.  
57 See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (U.S. 1982).  
58 Supra Note 37, at 163. 
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However, that is just the first prong. It is not enough to just have general knowledge that 
there are purchasers of a product or service is using it to engage in infringing activities. In 
other words, “the defendant must supply its product or service to ‘identified individuals’ 
that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in trademark infringement.”59 
In the trademark context, vicarious liability is essentially the same as in the tort 
context: “the plaintiff seeks to impose liability based on the defendant's relationship with 
a third party tortfeasor.”60 In other words, in order to find liability for a vicarious 
trademark infringement, “the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual 
partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or 
exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product."
61
 
Lastly, there is trademark dilution. The theory behind trademark dilution is "if 
customers or prospective customers see the plaintiff's famous mark used by other persons 
in a non-confusing way to identify other sources for many different goods and services, 
then the ability of the famous mark to clearly identify and distinguish only one source 
might be 'diluted' or weakened."
62
.  Simply put, trademark dilution is "the whittling away 
of the established trademark's selling power and value through its unauthorized use by 
others." 
63
In fact, in 1996, trademark dilution was still based entirely upon state law  
                                                        
59 Id. (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 
n.19, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984)).  
60Id at 165. 
61  Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 
F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 
62  Id. at 167; See also, 4 McCarthy § 24:67 
63  Id. (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 111 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted)). 
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because Federal law had yet to recognize the dilution doctrine.
64
 Then, in 1996, The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) was passed and subsequently amended a great 
deal in 2006.  
65
The FTDA currently states that   
“[T]he owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an injunction 
against another person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name 
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of 
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury.”66 
 
In both the district courts opinion and the Court of Appeals opinion in Rosetta 
Stone v. Google, there was a consideration of several similar elements to a trademark 
infringement claim as well as some diverging analysis’ on the aforementioned claims. As 
technology expands in a variety of areas it seems the Courts are faltering in some efforts 
to keep up with the ever changing, ever exploring and inventive realm of intellectual 
property.  
III. Rosetta v. Google, District Court 
 
Initially, Rosetta Stone brought seven claims for relief against Google after 
learning that Google had started to sell keywords to third-party advertisers through their 
AdWords program, keywords that Rosetta Stone had already trademarked.
67
 Rosetta 
Stone filed claims against Google in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
alleging that Google was “actively assisting third-party advertisers to mislead consumers 
and misappropriate Rosetta Stone’s trademarks by using trademarks (1) as keyword   
                                                        
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66
 Id; see also, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) 
67
 Supra note 2, at 
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triggers for paid advertisements and (2) within the title and text of paid advertisements on 
Google’s website.”68 Both Google and Rosetta Stone moved for summary judgment. 
69
There were five issues before the Eastern District court of Virginia in the case:
70
 direct 
trade mark infringement, the functionality doctrine, contributory trademark infringement, 
vicarious trademark infringement, and trademark dilution.  
 
The first issue dealt with by the Court is whether or not Google is liable for direct 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.
71
 More specifically, the query before the 
Court was whether Google’s auctioning of the Rosetta Stone Marks as keyword triggers 
to other advertisers through their AdWords program as a sponsored link was likely to 
create confusion among consumers.
72
 The District Court only addressed three of the nine 
confusion factors, finding the other factors were not in dispute.
73
 The three factors the 
Court analyzed were “(1)the defendants intent; (2) actual confusion; (3) and the 
consuming public’s sophistication.74 The Court found that “no genuine dispute of 
material facts that exist[ed] [that] would cause a reasonable juror to find that Google 
intended to confuse potential purchaser’s of Rosetta Stone’s products.”75  The Court 
found that there was no evidence suggesting that Google was trying to pass off it’s own 
goods and services as the goods or service of Rosetta Stone, noting “the relevant intent in 
trademark cases is not merely an intent to profit…but an “intent to confuse the buying  
                                                        
68 Supra note 3.  
69 Îd. 
70 Id. 
71 Supra note 3, at 540.  
72 Id. at 541.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
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public.
76
  The Court could not agree with Rosetta Stone and did not find that Google’s 
intent  “in providing third party advertisers with the opportunity to bid on the Rosetta 
Stone Marks … violated the Lanham Act.”77  
As for Actual Confusion the Court found that “Rosetta Stone’s evidence of actual 
confusion-the testimonies of five individuals out of more than 100,000 impressions over 
six years—is de minimus.”78 Google also provided rebuttal evidence showing that all five 
of the individuals who purchased the other language software did so knowing that they 
were not purchasing Rosetta Stone products.
79
  
Finally, the Court held that Rosetta Stone was mistaken in assuming that their 
relevant market was the public at-large or anyone using a computer. 
80
 Rather, the Court 
explained that only potential buyers of the products and because the Rosetta Stone 
program is expensive and time consuming, the court held that “given the time 
commitment of learning a language, [the potential buyers] are more likely to spend time 
searching and learning about Rosetta Stone’s products.”81 Therefore, after evaluating the 
three sub-factors in dispute, the Court found that Google’s use of Rosetta’s marks did not 
amount to direct infringement.
82
  
The second factor the court addressed out of the five was the functionality 
doctrine. The functionality doctrine “prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate   
                                                        
76  Id. (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 
1992)). 
77 Id. at 542. 
78 Id at 543; see also George &Co. L.L.C. v. Imagination Entm’t 575 F. 3d at 398.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 544. 
81 Id at 545. 
82 Id.  
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competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.”83 The Court 
found that if Google was deprived of using the marks of Rosetta Stone, then the 
consumer also would be deprived of the ability to quickly find possible relevant websites 
that “promote genuine Rosetta Stone products at competitive prices.” 84 Courts have 
recognized the value in search engines and the information they provide to its users. 
Under the functionality doctrine an item will be found functional “if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”85 Here, the 
Court found that the way Google used the trademarked terms and keywords as triggers 
was functional so the functionality doctrine prevented the Court from finding 
infringement.
86
  
  
The third issue is whether Google is responsible for contributory infringement or 
service mark infringement under the Lanham Act. Rosetta Stone asserted that Google 
“intentionally induces third party advertisers to bid on Rosetta Stone's trademarks or 
knowingly continues to permit advertisers selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone products to 
use the trademarks in their Sponsored Link titles and advertisement text, despite Rosetta 
Stone's reports of infringement.” 87 Here, in order for Rosetta Stone to be successful with 
their claim against the defendants, they have to show that Google “intentionally induce[d] 
another to infringe a trademark, or [they] are continuing to supply its product to one  
                                                        
83 Id. (citing Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164, 115(1995)).  
84 Id. at 546.  
85 Id. at 545 (citing Trafix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.. 532 U.S. 23, 32, 121 
S.Ct. 1255, 149 L.Ed.2d 164 (2001)).  
86 Id. at 546.  
87 Id. at 534.  
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whom [they] know or ha[ve] reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”88 
Although Rosetta Stone provided the court with a spreadsheet showing that Google 
received Rosetta Stone’s warnings about domain names associated with counterfeit 
Rosetta Stone Sponsored Links, the Court was “unpersuaded” by Rosetta Stone’s 
evidence.
89
 The District Court compares this case to a case from the Second Circuit 
involving eBay Inc., another website that provides a service to its users.
90
 In that case, 
Tiffany jewelry was unable to demonstrate that eBay “was supplying services to 
individuals who it knew sold counterfeit Tiffany goods.”91 The Court in Rosetta held that 
“[l]ike Tiffany, Rosetta Stone fails to show that Google knew of the alleged infringing 
activity by its AdWords advertisers.” 92Also, the Court found no evidence that Google 
was “supplying a service to those it kn[e]w or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement.”93 The Court could not find Google contributorily liable and 
could not grant Rosetta Stone summary judgment.
94
  
The fourth issue is whether or not Google is liable for vicarious trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act. Rosetta Stone argued that Google exercises joint 
ownership and control over third party advertisers' Sponsored Link titles and 
advertisement text on its website and therefore Rosetta stone should be granted summary 
judgment.
95
 With the vicarious trademark infringement claim, the District court quickly   
                                                        
88 Id. at 546 (citing Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
850 n.10, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982)).  
89 Id at 547.  
90 Id. at 548.  
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 549. 
95 Id at 534.  
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dismissed Rosetta Stone’s claim and reliance on case law.96 The Court found that 
“Rosetta Stone’s claim for vicarious trademark infringement also fails because Google 
has no control over third party advertisers’ Sponsored Links or their use of the Rosetta 
Stone Marks in the advertisement text.” 97 The Court elaborated by saying “[a]bsent an 
agency relationship, vicarious liability can only be imposes if the defendant and infringer 
exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product.”98 The Court uses logic in 
explaining that they came to this finding based on the fact that “Google is not engaged in 
the business of selling goods but in selling space on a search page which happens to be a 
prime location for advertisers wishing to display their advertisements to online shoppers.” 
They further clarify their finding and hold that:  
“Without evidence that Google's Keyword Tools or its employees direct or 
influence advertisers to bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks, Rosetta Stone has 
not shown that Google controls the appearance and content of the 
Sponsored Links and the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks in those Links. 
Therefore, vicarious liability cannot be imposed on Google.”99 
 
The final issue the District Court addresses is whether Rosetta Stone should be 
granted summary judgment on Trademark Dilution Under the Lanham Act.
100
 Has 
Rosetta Stone sufficiently demonstrated to the Court an economic loss resulting from a 
decline in its brand name and if they have, is the loss attributable to Google's practice of  
                                                        
96 Id at 549.  
97
 Id.  
98
 Id. (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Assoc, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 
2007)(quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d at 
1150  
99 Id. at 550. 
100 Id. at 535.  
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auctioning Rosetta Stone's trademarks for profit to third party advertisers? The Court 
finds they have not.
101
 The Courts look to the Trademark Dilution Revision Act to see if 
it could apply to Rosetta Stone’s Marks here because:  
“Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act ("TDRA"), which removed a 
plaintiff's obligation to show proof of economic loss, a markholder is 
"entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the 
owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name 
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark[.]"”102 
 
The Court does find that Rosetta Mark’s are famous but it does not find Google 
liable for trademark dilution because there is no “proof that Google uses the Rosetta 
Stone marks to identify its own goods and services.”103 Google does not sell language 
learning software; it cannot be held liable under the Lanham Act for trademark 
dilution.
104
 Moreover, “Rosetta Stone fails to show [the Court] trademark dilution where 
the reputation of its Marks has not bee harmed since Google changed its trademark policy 
in 2004.”105 
“To establish trademark dilution, Rosetta Stone must prove: (1) 
its famous Marks are distinctive; (2) Google uses a mark in commerce 
that allegedly dilutes the famous Marks; (3) a similarity exists between 
the Rosetta Stone Marks and Google’s mark giving rise to an 
association between the marks; and (4) the association is likely to 
impair the distinctiveness or reputation of the Rosetta Stone Marks.”106  
   
                                                        
101 Id. at 550. 
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) 
103 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 551 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
104 Id. at 550.  
105
 Id.  
106
 Id. (citing Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C, 507 F.3d 252, 264-265 
(4th Cir. 2007))(listing the elements of a trademark dilution claim under the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act).  
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In this case, the Court finds that even if it “adopts the arguments that liability 
under § 1125(c) my be imposed for Google’s sale of the Rosetta Stone marks,” Rosetta 
will still not be able to satisfy the fourth and final element of it’s trademark dilution 
claim.
107
 The Court cannot find any way in which the reputation of the Rosetta Stone 
Marks have been impaired.
108
 Additionally, Rosetta Stone is not? able to show that 
Google’s trademark policy caused dilution by tarnishment and therefore, Rosetta Stone 
once more is denied summary judgment. 
109
 
To the dismay of Rosetta Stone, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Google on all Counts I-VI. 
110
 
 
IV. 4
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals  
Unsurprisingly, Google’s summary judgment victory was appealed by Rosetta 
Stone. 
111
The Court of Appeals for the 4
th
 Circuit heard the case and decided to affirm the 
district courts holding in part, vacate it in part, and remand it in part.
112
 The Court of 
Appeals, “affirmed the district court's order with respect to the vicarious infringement 
and unjust enrichment claims, but vacated the district court's order with respect to the 
direct infringement, contributory infringement and dilution claims and remanded these 
claims for further proceedings.” 113 The Court of Appeals determined that there were 
indeed genuine issues of material fact which required a trial as to whether Google’s sale  
                                                        
107 Supra note 85. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Supra note 37.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
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of keywords constituted trademark infringement or trademark dilution, and whether 
Google was contributorily or vicariously liable for the sale of counterfeit Rosetta Stone 
products that were being sold by the keyword advertisers.
114
  
The Court of Appeals dives right into the Likelihood of Confusion argument.
115
 
First, in recapping the lower courts analysis, the Court of Appeals recalls that the district 
court concluded that, “all three "disputed" factors favored Google.116 Furthermore, the 
district court then stated that “it had "[b]alanc[ed] all of the disputed likelihood of 
confusion factors, . . . [and] conclude[d] that Google's  use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
d[id] not amount to direct trademark infringement."
117
 On their appeal, Rosetta Stone 
argues that “the district court failed to consider the effect of the other "undisputed" 
confusion factors, suggesting that all of these factors favor Rosetta Stone.”118 
Additionally, Rosetta Stone also argues that that there also was  “sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the three "disputed" confusion factors favored 
Google or Rosetta Stone.”119 The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not 
commit reversible error in failing to address all the factors , however, the 4
th
 Circuit did 
stress the importance of providing a brief explanation on why the court skipped the 
factors.
120
  
The Court of Appeals finds that “nevertheless, we agree that summary judgment 
should not have been granted. As explained in the discussion that follows, the district   
                                                        
114 Id.  
115
 Id.  
116
 Id.at 153.  
117
 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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court did not properly apply the summary judgment standard of review but instead 
viewed the evidence much as it would during a bench trial.
121
 
 
On the issue of intent, the Court found that there was evidence that Google was 
aware that its policy, which allowed trademarks to be used in the text of ads, would create 
some level of confusion. 
122
However, Google also recognized that the use of the 
keywords would bring in more revenue.
123
  The Court of Appeals concluded while  
“viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Rosetta 
Stone” (because “they are required to do so on a motion for summary judgment”) there is 
a possibility that a “reasonable trier of fact could find that Google intended to cause con-
fusion in that it acted with the knowledge that confusion was very likely to result from its 
use of the marks.”124 
The Court of Appeals also found that the evidence provided by Rosetta Stone, that 
the lower court found to be “de minimus,” actually provided some “other evidence of 
actual confusion” from over 120 complaints in regards to counterfeit software. 125 Once 
again, the 4
th
 Circuit, for “for purposes of summary judgment” found it reasonable to see 
how there could be a link between the Sponsored Links that Google was allowing and 
actual customer confusion.
126
 Furthermore, Google’s corporate designees persuaded the 
Court of Appeals to admit and consider Google’s In-House studies for their evidentiary  
                                                        
121 Supra note 37, at155.  
122 Id. at 155.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 156.  
125 Id.  
126 Id at 159.  
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value.
127
 The  4
th
 Circuit found that these studies are “probative as to actual confusion in 
connection with Google’s use of trademarks…Google determining that there was ‘[n]o 
difference between strong and weak trademarks” with respect to confusion.128 
Additionally, the 4
th
 circuit held that survey reports the district court held to be 
“unreliable” should “have been added to the other evidence of actual confusion to be 
considered in the light most favorable to Rosetta Stone.” 129 
The Court of Appeals also took issue with the lower courts finding that the 
functionality doctrine was successfully used as an affirmative defense for Google. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the issue stating that  
“Google may well be able to establish that its use of Rosetta Stone’s marks in its 
AdWords program is not infringing use of such marks; however, Google will not 
be able to do so based on the functionality doctrine [because] it does not apply 
here and we reject it as a possible affirmative defense for Google.”130 
The court found that the functionality doctrine did not apply in these circumstances 
because “Rosetta stone uses its registered mark as a classic source identifier in 
connection with its language learning products and clearly there is nothing functional 
about Rosetta Stone’s use of it’s own mark.”131 
 For contributory infringement on appeal, Rosetta stone argues that the lower court 
misapplied the standard of review and in doing so they incorrectly awarded summary 
judgment to Google. 
132
Although the 4th circuit seems to agree with the end result of the 
district court granting summary judgment to Google for contributory infringement, they 
are extremely expressive in their disapproval of how the lower court reached the decision.  
                                                        
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Supra note 37, at 164 
131 Id. at 163.  
132 Id.  
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133
 The Court of appeals declared that “[i]n granting summary judgment to Google 
 because "Rosetta Stone has not met the burden of showing that summary judgment is 
proper as to its contributory trademark infringement claim," the district court turned the 
summary judgment  standard on its head.
134
The Court went on to further state that  
“while it may very well be that Rosetta Stone was not entitled to 
summary judgment, that issue is not before us. The only question in 
this appeal is whether, viewing the evidence and drawing all 
reasonable  inferences from that evidence in a light most favorable 
to Rosetta Stone, a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of 
Rosetta Stone, the nonmoving party.”135 
 
Lastly, the final issue the Court of Appeals disagreed with from the lower court’s 
ruling dealt with trademark dilution. 
136
 The 4
th
 Circuit vacated the lower court’s  holding 
and remanded the issue for “reconsideration of Rosetta Stone’s dilution claim.” 137The 
appeals courts stated that the lower court failed to examine the nominative fair use 
defense.
138
 For the defendant to avail [itself] of the nominative fair use defense[,] [they] 
(1) may only use so much of the mark as necessary to identify the product or service and 
(2)may not do anything that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the 
markholder.
139
 The nominative fair use comes into play when “the defendant uses to 
famous mark or identify or compare the trademark owner’s product.” 140Furthermore, the 
4
th
 Circuit instructs the district court “to reconsider whether ROSETTA STONE was a  
                                                        
133 Id. at 164.  
134 Id. at 164-165 (emphasis added).  
135 Id. at 165.  
136 Id. at 167.  
137 Id. at 170.  
138 Id. at 169.  
139 Id. at 169-170.  
140 Id. at 169.  
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famous mark for purposes of its dilution claim against Google… under 15 U.S.C. 
1125(c)(2)(A)”.141  
  
 
 
VI. Personal Analysis 
 
As illustrated by the different conclusions drawn by the two courts, there is no 
clear-cut answer to this issue nor is there any precedence, which may be relied on. 
Unfortunately, this case does not provide the court an opportunity to elucidate complex, 
unresolved issues in the field of Trademark law, which many were eagerly anticipating. 
On October 31, 2012,  Reuters website read: 
"The companies agreed to settle all claims and dismiss the suit, 
according to a filing on Wednesday in U.S. District Court in 
Alexandria, Virginia. The terms of the settlement were not 
specified….Rosetta Stone Inc and Google have agreed to dismiss the 
three-year-old trademark infringement lawsuit between them and to 
meaningfully collaborate to combat online ads for counterfeit goods 
and prevent the misuse and abuse of trademarks on the Internet,”142  
 
This settlement comes as somewhat of a surprise and a bit of a disappointment. 
After April’s decision from the 4th Circuit, my mind was somewhat changed. Initially, I 
supported Google’s position entirely. I believed their district court summary judgment 
show-down was a well-deserved victory. It was only in learning about the internal 
studies showing consumer confusion, relaxed attitude in response to trademark 
infringement from Google, and a somewhat tunnel vision approach to securing profits  
                                                        
141 Id. at 172-173.  
142 Rosetta Stone and Google settle trademark lawsuit, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/us-usa-court-rosettastone-google-
idUSBRE89U1GE20121031 (last visited, Dec. 18, 2012).  
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that I began to reevaluate my thoughts. Protecting property rights, especially intellectual 
property rights, are not about finding a way to “get by” on a technicality. I believe 
intellectual property rights are in place to foster growth in the ever-changing world and 
to encourage the sharing of ideas, as well as the reward of invention. Technology is fast 
becoming not only the way of the future, but also the way of today. I was looking 
forward to possibly having a strong precedent in place for trademark infringement cases 
and was hoping it would come from this case. However, Google and Rosetta settled and 
we are left waiting for a new case to come along to provide us with that precedent.  
 One thing that is clear- the likelihood of confusion test
143
 is a major factor 
analyzed by both courts
144
 in their analysis in trademark infringement.  Although each 
court took a different approach and decided on different rationales the commonality of 
using the likelihood of confusion test provides trademark infringement cases with some 
well established guidance. Although I do appreciate the reasoning opined by both courts I 
still feel a stronger affinity to the ruling by the district court. I understand why the Court 
of Appeals found that there were triable issues of fact and remanded some of the issue but 
I do believe, in a way, that the district court expedited the case and reached the correct 
conclusions.  
Although it has been asserted by some that they used the improper method for achieving 
summary judgment, after reading all of the facts and the cases I think that granting 
Google summary judgment was the best move for the Judiciary to make at the time. The 
analysis for the district court seemed more logical, especially their consumer 
sophistication , functionality,  and contributory infringement holdings.  
                                                        
143 Supra note 47.  
144 See Supra note 2; see also Supra note 37.  
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I understand that it is trying and difficult to balance the interests and needs of 
multiple parties; considering everything from the search engine’s needs and the needs of 
the searchers, to the advertisers, and the trademark holders. . Ultimately, I found myself 
convinced by the district court's well-reasoned opinion and practical application of law.  
 
  
 
